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This Article presents one of the first empirical studies of federal
religious freedom cases since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Hobby Lobby. Critics of Hobby Lobby predicted that it would open the
floodgates to a host of novel claims, transforming “religious freedom” from
a shield for protecting religious minorities into a sword for imposing
Christian values in the areas of abortion, contraception, and gay rights.
Our study finds that this prediction is unsupported. Instead, we find
that religious freedom cases remain scarce. Successful cases are even
scarcer. Religious minorities remain significantly overrepresented in
religious freedom cases; Christians remain significantly underrepresented.
And while there was an uptick of litigation over the Affordable Care Act’s
contraception mandate—culminating in Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of
the Poor—those cases have subsided, and no similar cases have
materialized. Courts continue to weed out weak or insincere religious
freedom claims; if anything, religious freedom protections are
underenforced.
Our study also highlights three important doctrinal developments in
religious freedom jurisprudence. The first is a new circuit split over the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The second is confusion over the
relationship between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that is
currently plaguing litigation over President Trump’s travel ban. The third
is a new path forward for the Supreme Court’s muddled Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
In the old days, religious liberty was mainly about protecting religious
minorities—Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Amish, Native Americans, and
others who were overlooked by an insensitive majority. Today, religious
liberty is mainly about sex—especially Christians who object to abortion,
contraception, and gay rights. Laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and cases like Hobby Lobby1 and the Little Sisters of the Poor2
have emboldened the Christian majority to wield “religious liberty” as a
sword to take away other people’s rights, rather than a shield to protect
1
2

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Zubik v. Burwell (Little Sisters of the Poor), 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
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religious minorities. And the courts are now being flooded with cases
involving Christians who object to selling flowers, cakes, or photography
services for same-sex weddings.
At least this is a common narrative in the media and some corners of
academia.3 But is it accurate?
We wanted to answer this question empirically. So we chose the home
of Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor—the Tenth Circuit—and,
beginning with a database of over 10,000 decisions, examined every
religious freedom decision within that Circuit over the last five (and in some
cases ten) years. We first presented our findings to over 100 federal judges
at the Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference in May 2017. We now expand on
those findings in this Article—one of the first empirical studies of the federal
“religious liberty docket” since Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor.4
3
See, e.g., Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A
Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 929–30 (2016) (“Hobby Lobby
redesigned the terrain for free exercise claims” and “opened the door for increased demands
from private entities for [religious] accommodations or exemptions . . . with little regard to
the problems of attenuation and harm to third parties.”); Marci A. Hamilton, Hobby Lobby
Has Opened a Minefield of Extreme Religious Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015, 1:24 PM),
https://nyti.ms/2vKAjuA (arguing that RFRA is “unconstitutional, unprincipled[,] and a
sword believers gladly wield against nonbelievers”); Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can
No Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015),
http://wapo.st/1e6WIWI?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.c81f54e607e5 (“While the RFRA may serve
as a shield to protect [religious minorities], it is now often used as a sword to discriminate
against women, gay and transgender people and others.”).
4
Several groundbreaking empirical studies predate Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of
the Poor and focus on the religious affiliation of judges or claimants. See Gregory C. Sisk,
Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An
Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004) [hereinafter
Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking]; Gregory C. Sisk,
How Traditional and Minority Religious Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from
Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021 (2005) [hereinafter Sisk, How Traditional
and Minority Religions Fair in the Courts]; Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and
the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
873 (2008); Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision
Making: An Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (2012); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael
Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions
in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2012) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Ideology
“All the Way Down”?]; Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before
the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371
(2013); Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012) [hereinafter Heise
& Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty].
Others have examined the success rates of free exercise or RFRA claims before Hobby
Lobby. See Amy Adamczyk, John Wibraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the
Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & STATE 237 (2004);
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L.
REV. 466 (2010).
Three empirical studies postdate Hobby Lobby. One examines the application of strict
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What we found upends the common narrative. Contrary to predictions
that Hobby Lobby would open the floodgates of religious liberty litigation,
these cases remain scarce, making up only 0.6% of the federal docket. And
contrary to predictions that religious people would be able to wield Hobby
Lobby as a trump card, successful cases are even scarcer: there have been
only five winning issues within the Tenth Circuit in five years (sharia,
polygamy, eagle feathers, contraception, and the Ten Commandments).
Moreover, despite claims that Christians would be the prime beneficiaries of
Hobby Lobby, religious minorities are significantly overrepresented in the
cases relative to their population, while Christians are significantly
underrepresented. And while there was an uptick of RFRA claims
challenging the contraception mandate—culminating in Hobby Lobby and
Little Sisters of the Poor—those cases have subsided, and no similar cases
have materialized. Courts have had no problem weeding out weak or
insincere RFRA claims. If anything, RFRA has been underenforced. There
were no cases involving a clash between gay rights and religious liberty.5
But there were interesting doctrinal developments under RFRA, the Free
Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause that foreshadow potentially
significant changes in religious liberty jurisprudence.
We explore these findings in three parts. After summarizing our
methodology (Part I), we first examine the overall number and type of
religious liberty decisions—the “religious liberty docket,” so to speak (Part
II). We find that religious liberty decisions are scarce, that half of all
decisions involve prisoners or asylum seekers, and that the contraception
mandate produced an anomalous spike in RFRA cases that has now subsided.

scrutiny in free exercise cases from 1990 to 2015. See Caleb C. Wolanek & Heidi Liu,
Applying Strict Scrutiny: An Empirical Analysis of Free Exercise Cases, 78 MONT. L. REV.
275 (2017). Another examines the effect of judges’ religious affiliation in religious liberty
cases. See Sepehr Shahshahani & Lawrence J. Liu, Religion and Judging on the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 716 (2017). The third examines religious
exemption requests after Hobby Lobby and compares them with speech claims. See Stephanie
H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense
of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079777 (November 30, 2017 draft).
5
In other jurisdictions, there have been religious liberty cases involving the application
of antidiscrimination laws to individuals who religiously object to participating in a wedding
ceremony or similarly expressive events. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, No. 16-111 (S. Ct.) (oral argument scheduled Dec. 5, 2017);
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 17-108 (S. Ct.) (cert petition pending); Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. 13-585 (S. Ct.) (cert denied); Lexington Fayette Urban
Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-000745-MR, 2017
WL 2211381 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017). But those cases have typically been brought in
state court under state or local antidiscrimination laws. There were no similar cases in any
federal court within the Tenth Circuit during our five-year time period.
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Next we examine the religious makeup of religious liberty claimants—
the “religious liberty demographic” (Part III). We find that religious
minorities bring a disproportionate share of claims, and that Christians
remain statistically underrepresented despite the unusual spike in
contraception mandate cases.
Finally, we examine the success and failure of various types of religious
liberty claims (Part IV). We find that successful religious liberty claims are
very rare, that courts have no trouble weeding out weak religious liberty
claims (and may well be underenforcing religious liberty protections), and
that religious liberty cases are more than ten times more likely than other
cases to provoke a dissent. We also highlight several doctrinal developments
in the most interesting cases—such as a new circuit split over Native
American use of eagle feathers; confusion over the relationship between the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that is currently infecting the
litigation over President Trump’s travel ban; and a new path forward for the
Supreme Court’s muddled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Ultimately, this study shows that the state of religious liberty in the
federal courts is far more interesting and nuanced than the conventional
narrative would suggest. Religious liberty cases are scarce and often
difficult. But they remain crucial for navigating the difficult boundary
between church and state.
I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our data set consists of all religious liberty decisions within the Tenth
Circuit over the last five years (2012–2017).6 We chose the Tenth Circuit in
part because it has been the leading edge of the conflict over the
contraception mandate—including the locus of the Hobby Lobby and Little
Sisters of the Poor cases—and in part because one of us was asked to address
religious freedom for an audience of Tenth Circuit federal judges. Although
the Tenth Circuit may not be perfectly representative of the federal courts,7
6

The exact dates are from February 25, 2012 to February 24, 2017, inclusive. As
discussed in Part II.D, infra, an additional five years of research was conducted for RFRA
claims, providing a data set for RFRA claims from February 25, 2007 to February 24, 2017,
inclusive.
7
Several features make the Tenth Circuit an attractive circuit to study. First, during the
relevant timeframe, the Tenth Circuit was closely balanced politically—with 47.4% of active
judges appointed by Republican presidents and 52.6% of active judges appointed by
Democratic presidents. (We calculated this by tallying the total number of months served by
active Republican appointees during our timeframe (314) versus the total number of months
served by active Democratic appointees (349).) We do not assume that political ideology
plays a role in religious freedom cases, but some empirical studies have found that the party
of the appointing judge is a statistically significant variable in some religious freedom cases.
See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?, supra note 4. Examining a circuit
with an even balance of Republican and Democratic appointees would reduce any such effect.
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its docket provides a broad cross section of cases, and the narrower data set
allows us to take a deeper dive into some of the most difficult and interesting
cases. To weed out frivolous claims and non-precedential orders, we
excluded unreported district court decisions, as other scholars have done in
similar studies.8 But we included all reported district court decisions and all
Tenth Circuit decisions (both reported and unreported).
To compile this data set, we ran the following searches in Westlaw’s
Tenth Circuit Federal Cases database:
1. adv: “relig!” & DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered
to include all reported decisions in the district courts and Tenth
Circuit.
2. adv: “relig!” & DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered
to include all unreported decisions in the Tenth Circuit.
This search yielded 378 results—213 reported decisions and 165
unreported decisions. We reviewed each decision to determine whether it
involved at least one of the following types of religious liberty claims:
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech Clause, Equal
Protection Clause, RFRA, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), Title VII, the ministerial exception, religious association,
autonomy, and asylum.
Of the original 378 decisions, 118 decisions—80 appellate court
decisions and 38 district court decisions—involved at least one live religious
liberty claim.9 We considered a religious liberty claim live if it had not
already been resolved at an earlier stage of the case. Thus, a decision that
Second, during the relevant timeframe, the Tenth Circuit had a fairly typical reversal
rate in the U.S. Supreme Court of 64.7%. (We calculated this by examining all reversals for
October Terms 2012–2016 as tallied by SCOTUSblog. SCOTUSblog, Stat Pack Archive,
http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/ (2017).) The highest reversal rate was the
Third Circuit, at 87.5%; the lowest was the First Circuit, at 50%; the average over all circuits
was 71.6%. Of course, the reversal rate for all cases does not tell us anything specific about
religious freedom cases, but it is one indicator that the Tenth Circuit is average in its
jurisprudence as a whole.
Third, the Tenth Circuit’s religious demographic is similar to the religious
demographic of the nation as a whole—with a breakdown of 72% Christian, 3% other
religions, and 23% unaffiliated in the Tenth Circuit, compared with 71% Christian, 2% other
religions, and 23% unaffiliated in the nation as a whole. See infra Table 8.
One difference between the Tenth Circuit and the nation as a whole is that the Tenth
Circuit has a higher proportion of Native Americans and members of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) than does the nation as a whole. Thus, we consider
those demographic groups in greater detail in our findings below.
8
See Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 4, at 6 & n.7 (discussing reasons for excluding
unreported decisions); Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking, supra note 4, at 534–39 (same).
9
Of the 372 cases, 54 cases touched on religion-related issues, but did not include a
religious claim, and 199 cases only mentioned “religion” or “religious” (or, as one mentioned,
“relight”).
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mentioned that a religious liberty claim had already been resolved earlier in
the case was not included, but a decision that mentioned that the religious
claim had not yet been resolved, even if the court ultimately ruled on a
procedural issue or on the merits of another claim, was included. These 118
decisions compose our data set of religious liberty decisions.10
We coded each decision separately, regardless of whether there were
multiple decisions in the same case. The reasons for this are twofold. First,
it allowed us to observe the relative frequency that various religious claims
and religious claimants came before the federal courts, providing a more
complete picture of litigation. Second, it eliminated subjective judgment
calls about how to code a case when there were multiple decisions over the
life of a case (such as a decision on a request for preliminary injunction, an
interlocutory appeal, and a subsequent ruling on remand) or when the same
court issued more than one decision addressing different parts of the case or
addressing the case in different procedural postures.11
For each decision, we coded the following variables:
 The court;
 The date;
 Whether the decision was reported or unreported;
 Whether the Tenth Circuit decision was heard en banc;
 Whether the Tenth Circuit decision was unanimous;
 Whether the plaintiff was filing pro se;
 Whether the religious claimant was an individual, prisoner, or
organization;
 What the religious affiliation of the religious claimant was, if
known;
 Whether the decision was an overall win or loss for the
religious claimant;
10

We analyze this data set, as well as various subsets of it, throughout this Article.
An alternative approach would be to code only one decision from each “stage” of the
litigation. Cf. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking,
supra note 4, at 552–53. But this approach is not without its drawbacks. Take, for example,
a case where a court grants one group of plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against a
regulation, Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (W.D. Okla. 2014),
but later in the same case grants (or denies) another preliminary injunction to a broader group
of plaintiffs against a different version of the regulation, Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v.
Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 126 (W.D. Okla. 2014). It is not at all clear why either decision
should be ignored when both decisions required the court to address the merits of slightly
different religious freedom claims. Thus, coding only one decision from each level of the
litigation risks ignoring valuable information. It also tends to downplay the extent to which
certain types of claims consume more judicial resources (in the form of more decisions). And
it also leaves room for subjective judgments about which of multiple decisions to code. In
our data set, there were approximately five decisions (depending on one’s definition of a
“stage”) that would be eliminated by coding only one decision per “stage.”
11
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What types of religious liberty claims were presented;
Whether each religious liberty claim was a win or loss; and
Whether each win or loss was based on the merits of the claim
or on other grounds.
We further explain our coding methodology at appropriate places in the
analysis of our findings below.
II. NUMBER AND TYPE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMS
A. Religious Liberty Cases are Relatively Scarce.
We first wanted to determine how often religious liberty cases arise as
a percentage of the federal courts’ docket. To do this, we searched within
our target dates for all cases of any kind (all Tenth Circuit decisions, and all
reported district court decisions)—yielding a total of 10,025 cases.12 This
means that the 118 religious liberty decisions during that time period
constitute 1.2% of all decisions. That figure is higher for the Tenth Circuit
(1.3%) than for the district courts (1.0%). This could suggest that religious
liberty decisions are more likely than average to be appealed. Alternatively,
because our data set excludes unpublished district court decisions, it could
mean that district courts resolve religious liberty cases more often using
unpublished opinions. More on this later. Either way, the 1.2% of decisions
involving any type of religious liberty claim suggests that religious liberty
cases are a fairly small portion of the courts’ docket.13
The paucity of religious liberty decisions is even more apparent when
we consider the prevalence of decisions involving prisoners or asylum
seekers. Of the 118 religious liberty decisions in our data set, 39 (33%)
involve cases brought by prisoners and 20 (17%) involve cases brought by
individuals seeking asylum. In other words, half of all religious liberty
decisions involved prisoners or asylum seekers.

12
We searched all Tenth Circuit decisions for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-252017), yielding 6,131 cases. We then searched each federal district court within the Tenth
Circuit for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered to include only reported cases,
yielding 3,894 cases—949 Colorado district court cases, 649 Kansas district court cases, 785
New Mexico district court cases, 561 Oklahoma district court cases, 556 Utah district court
cases, and 394 Wyoming district court cases.
13
Religious liberty cases are also scarce in comparison with other types of cases. For
example, one study of all federal cases during the three years post Hobby Lobby compared
the volume of speech and expression cases to religious exercise cases, finding that speech and
expression cases outnumber religious claims at a ratio of about 3:1. See Barclay & Rienzi,
supra note 4, at 55 Table 2; cf. id. at 57 Table 6 (Between 1946–2016, the United States
Supreme Court has heard 344 speech and association cases compared to only 29 religious
exercise cases.).
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The vast majority of these cases were unsuccessful. Of the 39 prisoner
cases, 87% were pro se, 87% were unpublished, and 82% were
unsuccessful.14 Prisoners tend to bring a high percentage of meritless claims,
and the resolution of those claims often tells us little about federal religious
liberty jurisprudence. Thus, for the remainder of our analysis, we exclude
prisoner cases unless otherwise noted.15
The 20 asylum cases were also largely unsuccessful. All of these cases
were heard by the Tenth Circuit on direct appeals from the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) under a very deferential standard of review.
Only one case resulted in a remand to the BIA—meaning that 95% were
unsuccessful. Thus, for similar reasons, we exclude these cases from our
analysis unless otherwise noted.16
Excluding the 59 decisions involving prisoners and asylum seekers
leaves us with a revised data set of 59 religious liberty decisions—23 from
the Tenth Circuit, and 36 from district courts.17 Obviously, these decisions
make up an even smaller portion of the courts’ overall docket: 0.6% of all
cases.18 But now, percentages for the Tenth Circuit and district courts are
reversed: religious liberty decisions make up 0.4% of the Tenth Circuit’s
docket and 0.9% of the district courts’ docket. This suggests that, once we
control for prisoner and asylum cases, religious freedom cases are not more
likely to be appealed than other cases. In fact, they may be less so.
This also means that Tenth Circuit judges hear and decide religious
liberty cases infrequently. If we spread the 23 Tenth Circuit decisions across
5 years, 12 active judges, and 7 senior judges, that would mean that a Tenth
Circuit judge, on average, would sit on a panel producing a religious liberty
14

There were 7 prisoner decisions that included at least one successful religious claim:
Robertson v. Biby, 647 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir. 2016) (free exercise); Williams v. Wilkinson,
645 F. App’x 692 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA, free exercise, and equal protection); Woodstock
v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016) (RLUIPA and free exercise); Marshall v.
Wyoming Dep’t of Corr., 592 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2014) (free exercise); Tennyson v.
Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d
48 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); McKinley v. Maddox, 493 F. App’x 928 (10th Cir. 2012)
(RLUIPA). See infra Part IV.H.
15
For a fuller discussion of religious demographics in prisoner cases, see infra Part II.C.
For a fuller discussion of success rates in prisoner cases, see infra Part IV.H.
16
For a fuller discussion of religious demographics in asylum cases, see infra Part II.D.
For a fuller discussion of success rates in asylum cases, see infra Part IV.H.
17
Note that 57 out of the 59 decisions we are excluding came from the Tenth Circuit;
only 2 came from the district courts. The breakdown of the remaining district court decisions
is as follows: 16 from the District of Colorado (43%); 5 from the Western District of
Oklahoma (14%); 4 from the District of Kansas (11%); 4 from the District of New Mexico
(11%); 4 from the District of Utah (11%); 3 from the District of Wyoming (8%); and 1 from
the Northern District of Oklahoma (3%).
18
Excluding 59 prisoner and asylum decisions leaves us with 9,966 total decisions. 59 /
9,966 = 0.006.
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decision once every 13 months and would author a religious liberty decision
once every 40 months.19
B. The Most Common Claims are RFRA, Free Exercise,
Establishment, and Title VII.
When the courts do eventually decide a religious liberty case, what
types of claims do they resolve? As noted above, half of all religious liberty
decisions involve prisoners or asylum seekers. Prisoners typically raise
claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.
Asylum seekers invoke the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
But what about the other half of decisions? Table 1 displays a
breakdown of the types of claims raised in the remaining 59 decisions.
(Because most decisions involve more than one type of claim, the numbers
and percentages add up to more than 59 and 100%, respectively.)20

19

As of early 2017, there were 12 active judges and 7 senior judges on the Tenth Circuit.
Judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, TENTH CIRCUIT HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
http://www.10thcircuithistory.org/list-tenth-circuit-judges. Assuming a senior judge carries
one-half of an active case load, we get the following: 23 decisions * 3 judges per panel / 5
years / 15.5 judges = 0.890 religious liberty panels per judge per year, or 1 panel every 13.5
months (12/0.890). Assuming a judge authors a decision in one third of her panels, this yields
1 decision every 40.4 months. We have not accounted for separate opinions (like
concurrences or dissents) or en banc proceedings, which would alter the numbers very slightly
toward greater frequency. During the five years we analyzed, there was one en banc decision
and two decisions involving dissents from denial of rehearing en banc. See Felix v. City of
Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc); Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2015) (dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th
Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch sat on the Tenth Circuit for over ten years, including the entire
time covered by our data set. U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR
NOMINEE
TO
THE
SUPREME
COURT:
JUDGE
NEIL
M.
GORSUCH
2,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20M.%20Gorsuch%20SJQ%20(Pub
lic).pdf. During his tenure, he heard over 2,700 cases, of which 40 (1.5%) touched on
religious liberty. Id. at 25, 30–32; Hearing on the Nomination of the Honorable Neil M.
Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) (written testimony of Hannah C.
Smith, Senior Counsel, Becket). Of those 40, there were 11 opinions that involved the same
religious claims we looked at and did not involve prisoners or asylum seekers—i.e., 0.4% of
his docket as a whole. This is the same percentage we found during our time period for the
Tenth Circuit as a whole. It means that Judge Gorsuch participated in roughly one religious
liberty decision per year.
20
All percentages are rounded to the nearest full percent. Tables that include decimals
use up to two significant digits.
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Table 1. Types of Religious Liberty Claims
Type of Claim
No.
Percentage
RFRA
23
39%
Free Exercise Clause
22
37%
Establishment Clause
19
32%
Title VII
17
29%
Free Speech Clause
12
20%
Equal Protection Clause
7
12%
Religious Association
4
7%
RLUIPA
1
2%
Autonomy
0
0%
Ministerial Exception
0
0%
RFRA and free exercise claims are the most common. RFRA claims
are examined in detail in the next section. RFRA and free exercise are
followed closely by claims under the Establishment Clause and Title VII,
and then more distantly by free speech. There are only a few claims
involving equal protection, religious association, or RLUIPA.
Interestingly, there are no decisions involving land-use claims under
RLUIPA. That does not mean these claims never arise, only that they arise
infrequently and not recently.21 Some commentators have criticized
RLUIPA, arguing that it gives religious organizations a “blank check” to
challenge local zoning laws and makes it virtually impossible for local
zoning authorities to defend themselves.22 Others (including one of us) have
argued that RLUIPA is modest and underenforced.23 The absence of any
RLUIPA land-use decisions in the last five years would seem to support the
latter.
Also interesting is that there have been no ministerial exception cases
in the last five years. The ministerial exception is a constitutional doctrine
that has long barred certain types of employees (those performing important
religious functions) from suing their religious employer on certain types of
claims (those that would entangle the courts in religious questions or impose
an unwanted leader on a religious organization). In 2012, at the beginning
21
There have only been a few RLUIPA land-use cases in the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g.,
Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010);
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006); Grace
Church of Roaring Fork Valley v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Pitkin Cty., Colo., 742 F. Supp. 2d
1156 (D. Colo. 2010).
22
See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The Circus That Is RLUIPA: How the Land-Use Law that
Favors Religious Landowners Is Introducing Chaos into the Local Land Use Process,
FINDLAW (Nov. 30, 2006), http:// writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20061130.html.
23
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and
Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021 (2012).
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of our data set, the Supreme Court decided its first ministerial exception case,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.24 At
the time, the federal government argued that ruling in favor of the church
would create a slippery slope allowing churches to assert a ministerial
exception defense to all sorts of claims in all sorts of circumstances.25 After
the Court ruled unanimously for the church, some commentators criticized
the decision on similar grounds.26 But that slippery slope has not
materialized in the Tenth Circuit. Although courts within the Tenth Circuit
issued four ministerial exception decisions in the ten years before HosannaTabor,27 they have decided none in the five years since.
C. There was a Spike in RFRA Claims Against the Contraception
Mandate.
Because the most common type of religious liberty claim was based on
RFRA, a closer look at RFRA decisions is warranted. Of the 59 decisions
not involving prisoners or asylum seekers, 23 involved a RFRA claim.28 Of
these, 18 (78%) involved the contraception mandate—a federal regulation
requiring employers to cover contraception in their health insurance plan.29
Three (13%) involved Native American access to eagle feathers.30 One (4%)
involved a pro se challenge to the classification of marijuana as a Schedule
24

Tabor.

132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). Co-author Goodrich was co-counsel for the church in Hosanna-

25
Brief for the Federal Respondent at 44–46, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(No. 10-553).
26
See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2012); Leslie C. Griffin, The
Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013); Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even
More Anomalous: On Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution, 19
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400 (2012).
27
A search for lower court decisions in the Tenth Circuit that mention “ministerial
exception,” excluding unreported district court decisions, reveals four ministerial exception
decisions in the ten years preceding Hosanna-Tabor: Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese
of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo.,
289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002); Braun v. St. Pius X Par., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (N.D. Okla.
2011); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004).
28
None of the 39 decisions in prisoner cases or 20 decisions in asylum cases involved a
RFRA claim.
29
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (requiring all group health plans and health insurance
issuers that offer non-grandfathered health coverage to provide coverage for certain
preventive services without cost-sharing, including, “[for] women, such additional preventive
care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration”).
30
U.S. v. Aguilar, 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (RFRA defense to killing an eagle
and possessing eagle parts); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D.
Okla. 2016) (state RFRA claim seeking permission to wear eagle feather at graduation); N.
Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (RFRA challenge to
government refusal to permit eagle take).
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I drug.31 And one (4%) involved an attempt to use RFRA as a defense to a
prosecution for sending a threatening letter to a doctor training to provide
abortions.32 Table 2 shows this breakdown of the four categories of RFRA
claims.
Table 2. RFRA Claims 2012–2017
Type of Claim
No.
Percentage
Contraception Mandate
18
78%
Native American
3
13%
Drugs
1
4%
Other
1
4%
All
23
100%
We suspected that the large number of contraception mandate cases in
2012–2017 was an anomaly. So we conducted a search of all RFRA
decisions over the previous five years: 2007–2012.33 That search returned
24 decisions (10 Tenth Circuit and 14 district court decisions), of which 8
decisions (6 Tenth Circuit and 2 district court decisions) involved a federal
or state RFRA claim.
The RFRA claims in these 8 decisions fall into the same categories we
have previously identified. There were no contraception mandate claims,
because the mandate was not imposed until January 20, 2012.34 But there
were five decisions (63%) involving Native Americans (four involving
access to eagle feathers, and one involving objections to an autopsy)35 and
three decisions (38%), in one case, involving the use of drugs.36 Table 3
shows this breakdown of the various categories of RFRA claims for the
previous five years.

31

Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014).
U.S. v. Dillard, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Kan. 2012).
33
We searched adv: “religious freedom restoration act” RFRA & DA(aft 02-24-2007 &
bef 02-25-2012)—first filtered to include all Tenth Circuit decisions, then filtered to include
all reported district court decisions in the Tenth Circuit.
34
News Release, A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum Servs. (Jan. 20, 2012). The first
lawsuit challenging the mandate was brought on November 10, 2011. See Complaint,
Belmont Abby Coll. v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 11-1989).
35
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011) (eagle feathers); Ross v. Bd.
of Regents of The Univ. of N.M., 599 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2010) (autopsy); United States v.
Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (eagle feathers); United States v. Hardman, 622 F.
Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009) (eagle feathers); United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308
(D. Utah 2009) (eagle feathers), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).
36
United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Quaintance, 315 F. App’x 711 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Quaintance, 523 F.3d 1144
(10th Cir. 2008).
32
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Table 3. RFRA Claims 2007–2012
Type of Claim
No.
Contraception Mandate
0
Native American
5
Drugs
3
Other
0
All
8

[Vol. 48:353
Percentage
0%
63%
38%
0%
100%

Combining these 8 RFRA decisions from 2007–2012 with the 23
RFRA decisions from 2012–2017 provides a new data set comprised of 31
RFRA decisions.37 This data is summarized in Table 4.

Type of Claim
Contraception
Mandate
Native American
Drugs
Other
All

Table 4. RFRA Claims 2007–2017
2007–2012 2012–2017 Total
0
18
18

Percentage
58%

5
3
0
8

26%
13%
3%
100%

3
1
1
23

8
4
1
31

This table suggests that the contraception mandate cases were an
anomaly. Not including the contraception mandate cases, there were only
13 RFRA decisions in 10 years (8 decisions from 2007–2012, and 5
decisions from 2012–2017). But the contraception mandate cases added
another 18 RFRA decisions in 5 years—more than doubling the rate of all
other RFRA decisions combined.
This dynamic must be kept in mind when considering the other aspects
of this study. For example, the five-year surge in contraception mandate
cases significantly affected the overall frequency of religious liberty
decisions. With those cases included in the data set, religious liberty
decisions (excluding prisoner and asylum claims) constituted 0.6% of the
courts’ docket.38 Without those cases, religious liberty decisions constituted
only 0.4% of the courts’ docket.39 The contraception mandate cases also
affect the demographics of religious liberty claimants and the overall success
rates of religious liberty claims, as we explain below.

37

Two decisions involve state RFRAs, both in cases brought by Native Americans. See
Ross, 599 F.3d 1114; Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla.
2016).
38
59/9,966 = 0.006.
39
41/9,948 = 0.004.
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But the RFRA numbers are also interesting in several other respects.
First, aside from contraception mandate cases, the number of RFRA cases is
quite small—only 13 decisions in 10 years. By way of comparison, over the
same 10-year period, there are 109 Tenth Circuit and reported district court
decisions mentioning the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)40—a
statute that receives far less national attention.
Second, the range of RFRA cases is quite narrow. Of the 13 noncontraception decisions, 8 involved Native Americans (7 seeking access to
eagle parts, 1 challenging an autopsy); 4 involved drugs; and 1 was an odd
case involving a threatening letter. This indicates that there is not a wide
range of groups invoking RFRA for a wide range of purposes.
Third, the share of RFRA decisions involving Native Americans is
surprisingly high—62% of the non-contraception mandate cases. These
decisions present an interesting parallel with the contraception mandate
cases. Specifically, both involve federal laws that directly conflict with
widespread practices among specific religious groups—namely, opposition
to facilitating contraception and abortion among Catholics and Protestants,
and the desire to use eagle feathers and eagle parts among Native Americans.
Thus far, the Native American cases within the Tenth Circuit have been
largely unsuccessful. But the Fifth Circuit recently ruled in favor of Native
Americans in an eagle feathers case, expressly relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, a contraception mandate case.41 That may
prompt additional challenges in the Tenth Circuit until the law is changed or
the legal questions are definitively resolved.
Finally, the success rate of RFRA claims is sharply divided. Of the 18
RFRA decisions involving the contraception mandate, 10 were successful—
i.e., resolved in favor of the religious claimant. But of the remaining 13
RFRA cases, only 2 were successful and one of those was later reversed by
a Tenth Circuit panel decision.42 We discuss these success rates in more
detail in Part IV, infra.

40

We searched adv: “national environmental policy act” & DA(aft 02-24-2007 & bef
02-25-2017)—first filtered to include all Tenth Circuit decisions, then filtered to include all
reported district court decisions in the Tenth Circuit. This returned 54 Tenth Circuit decisions
and 55 reported district court decisions.
41
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
42
United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274
(10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009).
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III. DEMOGRAPHICS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMANTS
In addition to the frequency and type of religious liberty claims, we
considered the identity of religious liberty claimants. In particular, what
religious groups are bringing claims? And are they being brought by
individuals or groups? Our results show that a disproportionate share of
claims are brought by individual non-Christians. And this finding becomes
even more significant when we control for the contraception mandate cases,
which were brought exclusively by Christians.
A. Methodology
Consistent with prior research, we relied upon the religious selfidentification of each claimant.43 In our data set, religious claimants can be
grouped into four broad categories.
 “Christian”: This group consists of all claimants who selfidentify as Christian—including Catholics, Protestants,44
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
(Mormons),45 and Fundamentalist Mormons.46 Those who
identified as Catholic, Protestant, or generically as “Christian”
are further grouped together under the subcategory “Catholic/
Protestant.”47
43
Heise & Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 247 (citing Pew
Research Center’s and Gallup, Inc.’s practice of relying upon self-identification by
individuals).
44
Protestants include evangelical, mainline, and historical black protestant groups.
45
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints typically refers to its members as
“Latter-day Saints” or “LDS.” Scott Taylor, LDS or Mormon? It Depends, DESERET NEWS
(Utah) (Apr. 2, 2011), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/700123737/LDS-or-Mormon-Itdepends.html. But the term “Mormon” is more common and is increasingly accepted by
members of the church itself. Id. This Article uses the more common term.
46
We use the term “Fundamentalist Mormon” to include groups that broke with the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints over the issue of polygamy, including the
Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (FLDS) and the Apostolic United
Brethren Church (AUB).
47
We recognize the labels “Christian” and “Catholic/Protestant” create some difficulties.
See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919,
967 (2004) (acknowledging that “the label of ‘Christian’ is often too simplistic to reflect the
reality of American religion”). Because several cases involved a combination of Catholics
and Protestants, and others referred to the religious claimants generically as “Christian,” we
have grouped these in a single subcategory labeled “Catholic/Protestant.” This eliminates the
need to choose between coding a case as either Catholic or Protestant when both groups were
involved, or to create a separate but almost certainly overlapping category of generic
“Christians.”
Other groups also identify as Christian but are not Catholic or Protestant—e.g.,
LDS/Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, among others. Of those groups, only Mormons
were involved in decisions in our data set. The “Catholic/Protestant” subgrouping also allows
us to consider Mormons separately from Catholics and Protestants, which is valuable because
Mormons make up less than 1.6% of the population nationally, Pew Research Center,
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“Other religions”: This group consists of members of all other
faith traditions—including Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs,
Native Americans, and other smaller groups.48
“Non-religious”: This group consists of non-religious
claimants who brought religious liberty claims to challenge the
expression of religion by others, including claims under the
Establishment Clause.
“Unknown”: This group consists of claimants whose religious
affiliation was not disclosed.

B. Religious Minorities Bring a Disproportionate Share of Claims.
We first consider the 59 religious liberty decisions that did not involve
prisoners or asylum seekers. Table 5 shows the religious demographics of
the claimants in these decisions.49
Table 5. Religious Claimant Demographics Per Decision
Religious Affiliation
No.
Percentage
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
25
42%
Fundamentalist Mormon
3
5%
Mormon
1
2%
Total
29
49%
Other Religions
Muslim
7
12%
Native American
4
7%
Hindu
2
3%
Total
13
29%
Non-Religious
10
17%
Unknown
7
12%

Religious Landscape Study: Religions, (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/, but a significantly larger percentage of the population in the Tenth Circuit,
including 55% of the population in Utah, Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study:
Adults in Utah, (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/utah/, and
9% in Wyoming, Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Wyoming,
(2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/wyoming/.
48
These include Rastafarian, Odinism, Paganism, Nations of Gods and Earths (Black
Muslim Movement), Christian Identity and Christian Separatism, Ever Increasing Faith,
Ashutosh Maharaj, and Moorish Science Temple of America.
49
Again, the numbers add up to more than 59 and more than 100% because some
decisions involved multiple claimants from different religious groups.
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A few points stand out. First, Catholics and Protestants are the largest
group, with 25 decisions; but they still account for fewer than half of all
decisions (42%). The second largest group is the non-religious claimants,
with 10 decisions (17%), 7 of which were Establishment Clause challenges.50
The third largest group is Muslims, with 7 decisions (12%), all but one of
which came in Title VII cases alleging religious employment
discrimination.51 The fourth largest is Native Americans, with 4 decisions
(7%), all involving eagle feathers.52 Next are Fundamentalist Mormons,
with 3 decisions (7%), 2 involving a challenge to Utah’s polygamy law, and
1 involving a church trust dispute.53 There are 2 cases involving Hindus
(5%), both in Title VII employment disputes.54 And there is 1 case involving
Mormons (2%), who brought Title VII employment and equal protection
claims.55
As noted above, however, we are studying an anomalous time period
involving a spate of 18 contraception mandate cases. What if those cases
were excluded? Those results are shown in Table 6.

50

See Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1215–21 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F. 3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016);
Fields v. City of Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 2014); Am. Humanist Ass’n, Inc. v. Douglas
County Sch. Dist. Re-1, 158 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (D. Colo. 2016); Medina v. Catholic Health
Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (D. Colo. 2015); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d
1233 (D.N.M. 2014); United States v. Goxcon-Chagal, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2012).
The other cases included two Title VII cases where the plaintiff was suing based on someone
else’s religious actions and one RFRA challenge to the drug classification of marijuana. See
Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014) (RFRA); Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y
of State for Kan., 2016 WL 4528065 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 2016) (Title VII); Didier v. Abbott
Labs., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (D. Kan. 2014) (Title VII).
51
See Chawla v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Colo. 2014) (Muslim
employee Title VII claim); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th
Cir. 2013) (same); Kaiser v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 504 F. App’x 739 (10th Cir. 2012) (same);
EEOC Comm’n v. JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2015) (same); EEOC v.
704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D.N.M. 2013) (same); EEOC v. Jetstream
Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015) (same); Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F.
Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (Establishment Clause, free exercise, and equal protection
claims).
52
U.S. v. Aguilar, 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (Native American eagle feather
case); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016) (same);
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015) (same); N. Arapaho Tribe v.
Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (same).
53
Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (polygamy law challenge);
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295 (10th
Cir. 2012) (church trust dispute); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013)
(polygamy law challenge).
54
Desai v. Panguitch Main St., Inc., 527 F. App’x 689 (10th Cir. 2013); Aluru v.
Anesthesia Consultants, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (D. Colo. 2016).
55
Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013).
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Table 6. Religious Claimant Demographics
Excluding Contraception Mandate Decisions
Religious Affiliation
No.
Percentage
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
7
17%
Fundamentalist Mormon
3
7%
Mormon
1
2%
Total
11
27%
Other Religions
Muslim
7
17%
Native American
4
10%
Hindu
2
5%
Total
13
32%
Non-Religious
10
24%
Unknown
7
17%
Excluding the contraception mandate cases, the largest single group of
claimants in the religious liberty decisions are the non-religious, at 24%.
Catholics and Protestants are tied for second with Muslims at 17%, despite
the fact that Muslims make up less than 1% of the population.56 Other
religions outnumber Catholics and Protestants by almost 2:1 (32% to 17%).
But none of this means very much if we do not know the religious
demographics of the Tenth Circuit as a whole. Although the U.S. Census
does not ask about religious affiliation,57 the Pew Research Center conducted
a comprehensive study of the nation’s religious landscape in 2014, the
middle year of our five-year timeframe.58 The results of that study, broken
56

See Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Colorado (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/colorado/ (<1% in Colorado); Pew
Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Kansas (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/kansas/ (1% in Kansas); Pew
Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in New Mexico (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/new-mexico/ (<1% in New
Mexico); Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Oklahoma (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/oklahoma/ (<1% in Oklahoma);
Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Utah (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/utah/ (1% in Utah); Pew Research
Center,
Religious
Landscape
Study:
Adults
in
Wyoming
(2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/wyoming/ (<1% in Wyoming);
Pew
Research
Center,
Religious
Landscape
Study
(2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (0.9% in the United States).
57
See Anne Farris Rosen, A Brief History of Religion and the U.S. Census, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.pewforum.org/2010/01/26/a-brief-history-ofreligion-and-the-u-s-census/ (explaining the history of religion on the U.S. Census).
58
Religious Landscape Study: About the Religious Landscape Study, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/about-the-religious-landscape-study/ (conducting a
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out by the states of the Tenth Circuit and nationally, is shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Religious Demographics in the
Tenth Circuit States and Nationally59
CO
KS
NM
OK
UT
WY

Religious
Affiliation
Christian
Protestant
Catholic
Mormon
Other
Mormon
Total
Other Religions
Muslim
Hindu
Native
American
Unaffiliated
(Non-Religious)

US

43%
16%
2%

57%
18%
1%

38%
34%
1%

69%
8%
1%

14%
5%
55%

44%
14%
9%

46.6%
20.8%
1.6%

<1%
64%

<1%
76%

1%
75%

<1%
79%

1%
73%

<1%
71%

<0.3%
70.6%

< 1%
<1%

1%
<1%

<1%
<1%

<1%
<1%

1%
<1%

<1%
<1%

0.9%
0.7%

< 1%

<1%

<1%

<1%

<1%

1%

<0.3%

29%

20%

21%

18%

22%

26%

22.8%

Not surprisingly, Catholics and Protestants are the largest religious
groups in most states. The one exception is Utah, where Mormons are a
majority at 55%. The next largest group consists of those who are
unaffiliated with a religion (including atheists, agnostics, and “nothing in
particular”), who make up 18% to 29%.
Using this data, combined with the estimated population for each state
in 2014,60 we can determine the religious demographics of the Tenth Circuit
as a whole.61 Those calculations are reflected in Table 8.
U.S. Religious Landscape Study based on telephone interviews with more than 35,000
Americans in all 50 states).
59
All percentages are drawn from the 2014 Pew U.S. Religious Landscape Study. See
supra note 56.
60
The United States Census Bureau estimates state populations per year. For 2014—the
same year the Pew study was conducted—the Tenth Circuit state populations were: 5,349,648
(Colorado); 2,899,360 (Kansas); 2,083,024 (New Mexico); 3,877,499 (Oklahoma); 2,941,836
(Utah); and 583,642 (Wyoming). NATIONAL, STATE, AND PUERTO RICO COMMONWEALTH
TOTALS DATASETS: POPULATION, POPULATION CHANGE, AND ESTIMATED COMPONENTS OF
POPULATION CHANGE: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html (last visited Nov.
18, 2017). The total population of the Tenth Circuit states in 2014 was 17,735,009. See id.
61
Multiplying the state population by the percentage of each religious group gave us the
population of each religious group in each state. Adding together each state population for
each religious group and then dividing by the total population, gave us the percentage each
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Table 8. Religious Demographics in the Tenth Circuit and Nationally
Religious Affiliation
US
10th Cir.
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
67.4%
60%
Mormon
1.6%
11%
Fundamentalist Mormon
<0.3%
1%
Total
70.6%
72%
Other Religions
Hindu
0.9%
1%
Muslim
0.7%
1%
Native American
<0.3%
1%
Total
1.9%
3%
Unaffiliated
22.8%
23%
In the Tenth Circuit states, Catholics and Protestants comprise about
7.4% less than the national average, while Mormons comprise about 9.4%
more than the national average. The percentage of other religions and those
who are unaffiliated is on par with the national average.62
Using the religious demographics of the Tenth Circuit as a whole, we
can now determine whether any particular religious demographic is
overrepresented, underrepresented, or accurately represented in their share
of religious liberty decisions as a whole. To do this, we use a number called
the representation ratio.63 For any given group:
% of decisions involving a religious group
representation ratio =

% of religious group as share of population

The representation ratio is a non-negative number that provides a
meaningful measure of the religious group’s descriptive representation.64 A
representation ratio of 0 indicates that a group is not represented at all.
Ratios below 1 indicate that the group is underrepresented in litigation
religious group comprised of the total population.
62
The Pew survey listed several religious minorities as “<1%” of the population in the
various Tenth Circuit states. See supra Table 7. Absent more precise data, we rounded each
of these groups up to 1%. This ensures that our representation ratio errs on the side of
caution—i.e., understating any degree of overrepresentation of religious minorities (except
for Mormons who have greater than or equal to 1% of the population in each Tenth Circuit
state).
63
Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 4, at 12 (citing PITKIN, HANNA F., THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION (1967)). Of course, out-of-circuit residents could file religious liberty
claims in the Tenth Circuit. But this does not appear to be common.
64
See id.
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compared with its population. A ratio of 1 means that the group’s share of
religious liberty decisions perfectly matches its share of the population as a
whole. Ratios above 1 show that the group is represented in a
disproportionately high share of religious liberty decisions compared with
its population.65
Table 9 shows the representation ratio of each religious group in all
religious liberty decisions in the Tenth Circuit, excluding prisoner and
asylum cases.
Table 9. Representation Ratio of Religious Claimants Per Decision
Religious Affiliation
Representation Ratio
Muslim
11.86
Native American
6.78
Fundamentalist Mormon
5.08
Hindu
3.39
Non-Religious
0.74
Catholic/Protestant
0.70
Mormon
0.16
This table shows that, as a portion of the total population, Muslims,
Native Americans, Fundamentalist Mormons, and Hindus are all
overrepresented as a share of religious freedom decisions. Non-religious and
Catholics and Protestants are somewhat underrepresented at 0.74 and 0.70,
respectively. And Mormons are significantly underrepresented at 0.16.
When we control for the anomalous spate of contraception mandate
cases, the differences are even sharper. Table 10 shows the representation
ratio of each religious group when contraception mandate cases (along with
prisoner and asylum cases) are excluded.
Table 10. Representation Ratio of Religious Claimants
Per Non-Contraception Mandate Decisions
Religious Affiliation
Representation Ratio
Muslim
17.07
Native American
9.76
Fundamentalist Mormon
7.32
Hindu
4.88
Non-Religious
1.06
Catholic/Protestant
0.28
Mormon
0.23

65

Id.
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Muslims, Native Americans, Fundamentalist Mormons, and Hindus are
even more overrepresented than before. Non-religious claimants are now
almost perfectly represented—although we might have expected them to be
the least represented group, given that we are considering only religious
liberty decisions. The representation ratio of Catholics and Protestants
dropped significantly from 0.70 to 0.28. This is not surprising, given that all
contraception mandate cases were brought by Catholics or Protestants.
Slightly less represented were Mormons, at 0.23.
These numbers contradict the popular narrative that religious freedom
cases predominantly involve the large Christian groups. This is not true in
absolute terms, as Catholics and Protestants were involved in only 42% of
religious liberty decisions, and only 17% of decisions when the anomalous
contraception mandate cases are excluded. But it is particularly untrue when
considering the religious demographics of the population as a whole, as
Catholics, Protestants, and Mormons are significantly underrepresented,
while non-Christian minorities are significantly overrepresented. This
suggests that religious liberty jurisprudence is disproportionately important
for protecting non-Christian religious minorities.
C. Religious Minorities Predominate in Prisoner Cases.
Thus far, we have considered the religious demographics in decisions
not involving prisoner or asylum claims. But prisoner and asylum cases also
have interesting religious demographics of their own. Table 11 shows the
religious demographics of claimants in prisoner decisions.
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Table 11. Religious Affiliation of Prisoner Decisions
Religious Affiliation
No.
Percentage
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
4
10%
Mormon
1
3%
Total
5
13%
Other Religions
Jewish
4
10%
Muslim
4
10%
Native American
3
8%
Christian Identity/Christian Separatism
2
5%
Nations of Gods and Earths
2
5%
Ever Increasing Faith
1
3%
Moorish Science Temple of America
1
3%
Odinism
1
3%
Paganism
1
3%
Rastafarian
1
3%
Satanist
1
3%
Total
20
51%
Unknown
13
33%
Over half of all prisoner decisions involved non-Christian religious
minorities. The most frequently appearing were Muslims, Jews, and Native
Americans. Decisions involving Muslims or Jews often involved challenges
to the denial of religious diets.66 Other decisions involved requests for access
to religious worship services, such as a Native American sweat lodge.67 Only
66
See, e.g., Chapman v. Lampert, 555 F. App’x 758 (10th Cir. 2014) (Orthodox Jewish
prisoner requests religious diet); Woodstock v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016)
(Jewish prisoner requests kosher diet); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App’x 692 (10th Cir.
2016) (Muslim prisoner requests kosher diet); Miller v. Scott, 592 F. App’x 747 (10th Cir.
2015) (Muslim prisoner requests halal or kosher diet).
67
See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (Native American prisoner
requests access to sweat lodge for religious ceremonies). Justice Gorsuch identified
Yellowbear as one of the ten most significant cases over which he presided when he was a
judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary: Questionnaire
for Nominee to the Supreme Court, 115th Cong. 25, 30–31 (2017) (statement of Neil Gorsuch,
Circuit J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit), https://www.judici
ary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20M.%20Gorsuch%20SJQ%20(Public).pdf. In that
case, Yellowbear, a Northern Arapaho Native American prisoner sought use of the prison’s
sweat lodge for prayer. 741 F.3d at 51–52. The prison denied his request. Id. The Tenth
Circuit found that under RLUIPA, the denial was a substantial burden on Yellowbear’s
religious exercise and that the prison failed to establish a compelling interest when it did not
quantify the costs associated with granting him access and that denial of access was not the
least restrictive means of accommodating its concerns. Id. at 62–64. Justice Sonya
Sotomayor quoted this opinion in her concurrence in another RLUIPA cases, Holt v. Hobbs.
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10% of prisoner decisions involved Catholics or Protestants—even less than
the 17% that involved Catholics or Protestants in non-contraception mandate
cases. Unfortunately, we were unable to calculate a representation ratio for
these decisions, because data on the religious demographics of Tenth Circuit
prisons is unavailable.68
D. Christians Bring a Majority of Asylum Cases.
Asylum decisions tell a different story. Table 12 shows the religious
demographics of claimants in asylum decisions.69

135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Holt, an Arkansas inmate Abdul
Muhammad was denied the ability to grow a half-inch beard in accordance with his Muslim
faith, even though Arkansas already allowed inmates to grow beards for medical reasons, and
Mr. Muhammad’s beard would be permissible in 44 state and federal prison systems across
the country. Id. at 859 (majority opinion); Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.
Ct. 853 (2015) (No. 13-6827). The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Mr. Muhammad
had shown a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that Arkansas failed to show a
compelling interest in prohibiting the beard. 135 S. Ct. at 859. Co-author Goodrich was cocounsel for the plaintiff in Holt.
68
One article reported federal prisoner religious demographics from 2013. See Mona
Chalabi, Are Prisoners Less Likely to Be Atheists?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:07
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-prisoners-less-likely-to-be-atheists/ (data was
obtained through a FOIA request). And a 2012 Pew study conducted a survey of prison
chaplains. See Pew Research Center, Religion in Prisons—A 50 State Survey of Prison
Chaplains, (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/03/22/prison-chaplains-exec/.
But neither provides accurate data on the religious demographics of prisoners within the Tenth
Circuit as a whole. Interestingly, the Pew survey reported on the likelihood that various types
of accommodations would be granted, finding that requests for religious books or texts and
meetings with leaders from the inmates’ faith are usually approved, requests for special
religious diets, items, or clothing are less likely to be approved, and requests for a special
hairstyle or grooming are most likely to be denied. Id. It will be interesting to see how those
numbers change in light of the Supreme Court’s first RLUIPA decision, Holt v. Hobbs, 135
S. Ct. 853 (2015), which held that a Muslim prisoner must be permitted to grow a half-inch
beard.
69
The percentages add up to more than 100% because one case, Bwika v. Holder, 527
F. App’x 772, 774 (10th Cir. 2013), involved both Christian and Muslim petitioners.
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Table 12. Religious Affiliation of Asylum Decisions
Religious Affiliation
No.
Percentage
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
14
70%
Mormon
2
10%
Total
16
76%
Other Religions
Sikh
2
10%
Hindu
1
5%
Ashutosh Maharaj
1
5%
Muslim
1
5%
Total
5
24%
The majority of decisions involved Christians (76%). Far fewer
involved other religious minorities (24%). But this is not surprising. In the
typical asylum case based on religious persecution, the asylum seeker is a
religious minority in her country of origin. For example, 10 of the 14
decisions involving Catholics or Protestants were brought by citizens of
China,70 where those groups are a minority71 and where persecution of
religious minorities since 2012 has reportedly intensified.72

70

Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2016); Daoi Kai He v. Lynch, 638 F. App’x
717 (10th Cir. 2016); Binbin He v. Lynch, 607 F. App’x 826 (10th Cir. 2015); Zhe Sun v.
Holder, 607 F. App’x 801 (10th Cir. 2015); Jin Jian Chen v. Lynch, 630 F. App’x 798 (10th
Cir. 2015); Jing Li v. Holder, 607 F. App’x 818 (10th Cir. 2015); Ronghua He v. Holder, 555
F. App’x 786 (10th Cir. 2014); Liying Qiu v. Holder, 576 F. App’x 855 (10th Cir. 2014); Jin
Hua Lin v. Holder, 500 F. App’x 782 (10th Cir. 2012); Yuan Shan Wu v. Holder, 501 F.
App’x 786 (10th Cir. 2012). The other four asylum decisions involving Catholics or
Protestants were brought by citizens of Kenya, Indonesia, Morocco, and Romania. See Ballad
v. Holder, 554 F. App’x 705 (10th Cir. 2014) (Morocco); Adam v. Holder, 576 F. App’x 804
(10th Cir. 2014) (Indonesia); Ilioi v. Holder, 566 F. App’x 652 (10th Cir. 2014) (Romania);
Bwika, 527 F. App’x 772 (Kenya).
71
In China, Chinese Buddhists comprise the largest faith group with an estimated 185–
250 million followers. James Griffiths & Matt Rivers, As Atheist China Warms to the Vatican,
Religious Persecution “Intensifies”, CNN (Mar. 1, 2017, 9:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com
/2017/02/28/asia/china-religious-persecution-christianity/index.html. Christianity is the
second largest faith group, with only 72–92 million followers. Id.
72
See, e.g., id. (“Christians, and other believers, have long faced oppression within
China.”); SARAH COOK, THE BATTLE FOR CHINA’S SPIRIT: RELIGIOUS REVIVAL, REPRESSION,
AND RESISTANCE UNDER XI JINPING
(Annie Bovarian et al. eds, 2017),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_ChinasSprit2016_FULL_FINAL_140pages
_compressed.pdf (Freedom House report covering religious persecution in China).
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IV. SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMS
In addition to the demographics of religious claimants, we wanted to
determine what types of religious liberty claims are succeeding on the merits
and what types are failing.
A. Methodology
To analyze success, we first coded each religious liberty decision as
either a win or loss. A decision counted as a win if any of the issues in the
decision were resolved in favor of the claimant raising the religious claim.73
It counted as a loss if all of the issues were resolved against the religious
claimant. Then, within the wins and losses we coded each decision as having
been resolved on purely procedural grounds or on the merits. Purely
procedural grounds consist of issues like mootness, lack of standing, or
failure to exhaust administrative remedies—issues that prevent a court from
opining on the merits of a religious liberty claim. But if a court addressed
the merits of a religious liberty claim in any way, it was coded as a resolution
on the merits. Finally, it is important to note that not all decisions on the
merits are created equally. For example, if a court holds that a plaintiff’s
claim survives summary judgment because there are disputed issues of fact,
that is not as significant as a grant of summary judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor. So our coding also considered whether a claim was only “partially”
successful (because it survived a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment) or fully successful (because the court granted the claimant a
preliminary injunction or summary judgment). Using the same system, we
also coded whether each individual religious claim in a decision won or lost
on the merits or on purely procedural grounds.
B. Successful Religious Liberty Claims are Rare.
Of the 59 religious liberty decisions excluding prisoners and asylum
seekers, 11 (19%) were resolved on procedural grounds (such as mootness74
or failure to exhaust administrative remedies75)—leaving 48 decisions that
addressed the merits. Of those 48 decisions addressing the merits, there were
21 wins (44%) and 27 losses (56%). As noted above, however, not all “wins”
are created equally. Of the 21 wins, 6 decisions were only “partial”
victories—i.e., the plaintiffs’ claims survived a motion to dismiss or motion

73
We treated Establishment Clause claims the same way—that is, we coded a decision
as a win if the court resolved any part of the claim in favor of the claimant challenging the
government’s action under the Establishment Clause. This eliminates any value judgments
about how Establishment Clause claims “should” be resolved.
74
See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
75
See, e.g., Paige v. Donovan, 511 F. App’x 729 (10th Cir. 2013).
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for summary judgment.76 Fifteen decisions were full victories on the
merits—either granting the claimant a preliminary injunction or resolving a
claim entirely in favor of the religious claimant. Thus, if we include partial
victories, religious claimants were successful 44% of the time; if we include
only full victories, claimants were successful 31% of the time.
As noted above, however, we are studying a timeframe involving an
unusual spate of 18 contraception mandate decisions. Seventeen of those
decisions reached the merits—with 10 ruling in favor of the plaintiffs (59%),
and 7 against (41%). That means that the contraception mandate decisions
tended to be more successful than average, raising the overall success rate in
religious liberty decisions. This is due in part to the fact that there were
multiple pending cases that all had to be resolved the same way—in favor of
the religious claimant—after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hobby
Lobby77 and Little Sisters of the Poor.78 If the contraception mandate
decisions are excluded, the success rate of plaintiffs is lower: 35% if we
include partial victories (11 wins out of 31 decisions) and 16% if we include
only full victories (5 wins out of 31 decisions). If we include prisoner and
asylum cases, the success rate would be even lower.79 Other studies have
found similarly low success rates on religious liberty claims.80
The bottom line is that successful religious liberty claims are rare. As
noted in Part II.A, there are not many religious liberty claims to begin with–
approximately 0.6% of the judicial docket. They are often resolved on purely
procedural grounds (19% of the time). When the courts do reach the merits,
they decide in favor of the plaintiffs, at most, 44% of the time (including
partial victories and the anomalous spate of contraception mandate cases),

76

While such a ruling might eventually lead to a settlement, that is not the same as a
final judgment on the merits.
77
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
78
Zubik v. Burwell (Little Sisters of the Poor), 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
79
See infra Part IV.H. Prisoners had a success rate of 25% for all victories and 0% for
full victories. Asylum seekers had only 1 partially successful decision out of 20 (5%).
80
For example, Sisk and Heise conducted studies from 1986–1995 and from 1996–2005
on how judges voted in decisions involving religious claims. For free exercise and
accommodation claims—which includes the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, RLUIPA, the
Equal Access Act, equal protection, free speech and employment-discrimination claims—
religious claimants were successful at a rate of 35.6% of judicial participation from 1986–
1995, and at a rate of 35.5% from 1996–2005. Sisk & Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty,
supra note 4, at 238–39 & n.39; Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religious Fare in the
Courts, supra note 4, at 1025. For Establishment Clause claims, religious claimants were
successful at a rate of 42.3% of judicial participations from 1986–1995, and at a rate of 39.8%
from 1996–2005. Sisk & Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?, supra note 4, at 1211 &
n.42. But there are differences between Sisk and Heise’s studies and ours that make
comparison difficult. For example, they included prisoner cases; we (for present purposes)
do not. They also counted each vote of each court of appeals judge separately; we counted
only the overall decision.
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and as little as 16% of the time (excluding partial victories and contraception
mandate cases). Thus, at the end of a five-year period encompassing over
10,000 decisions within the Tenth Circuit, there were only 15 fully
successful religious liberty claims (consisting of 10 contraception mandate
victories and 5 victories in other cases) on five discrete issues—sharia,
polygamy, eagle feathers, contraception, and Ten Commandments.
C. Success Rates Vary by Type of Claim.
Given the small number of victories, it is easy to consider them in
greater depth. Successful claims fall into the following five categories:
 10 victories in contraception mandate (RFRA) decisions;81
 3 victories in Establishment Clause decisions;82
 2 victories in free exercise decisions;83
 5 partial victories in Title VII cases;84 and
 1 partial victory in a speech case.85
We first wanted to consider the success rates of each type of claim. To
do this, we examined only decisions addressing the merits of a claim (either
partially or fully). We then divided the number of successful claims of each
type by the total number of claims of that type. The results are reflected in
Table 13.

81
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc);
Newland v. Burwell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (D. Colo. 2015); Armstrong v. Burwell, No. 13-cv00563, 2014 WL 5317354 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2014); Dobson v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1245
(D. Colo. 2014); Colorado Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (D. Colo. 2014);
Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (W.D. Okla. 2014); Catholic
Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (W.D. Okla. 2014); Newland v.
Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); Armstrong v. Sebelius, 531 F. App’x 938
(10th Cir. 2013); Newland v. Sebelius, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013).
82
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016) (striking down Ten
Commandments display); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D.N.M. 2014)
(same); Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (striking down sharia ban).
83
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015) (eagle feathers);
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (polygamy).
84
Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y of State for Kan., No. 15-cv-4918, 2016 WL 4528065
(D. Kan. Aug. 30, 2016) (no religion); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp.
3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015) (Muslim); EEOC v. JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo.
2015) (Muslim); EEOC v. 704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. New Mexico
2013) (Muslim); Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013)
(Mormon).
85
Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal of a
compelled speech claim).
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Table 13. Success Rate of Each Religious Claim
Religious Claim
Success Rate
RFRA
48%
Title VII
33%
Establishment Clause
29%
Free Exercise Clause
20%
Free Speech Clause
14%
This suggests that RFRA claims are most successful, Title VII and
Establishment Clause claims are moderately successful, and free exercise
and speech claims are least successful. But given the small sample size and
other dynamics, these numbers do not tell the whole story. For example, all
10 RFRA victories came in contraception mandate cases. If contraception
mandate cases are excluded, the 4 remaining RFRA decisions on the merits
were losses—resulting in a success rate of 0%. Furthermore, all 5 Title VII
victories were only partial—i.e., decisions denying a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment or motion to dismiss. If partial victories are excluded,
the 10 remaining Title VII decisions on the merits were all losses—also
resulting in a success rate of 0%. The same is true of the lone free speech
victory. Although the claim achieved partial success by surviving a motion
to dismiss, it was ultimately unsuccessful on the merits—resulting in a
success rate of 0%.86
Given the small number of successful religious liberty claims, it is
worth examining them in further detail—and, in some cases, contrasting
them with unsuccessful claims. Thus, in the following sections, we consider,
in turn, each type of successful claim: RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, and Title VII.87 We then offer brief thoughts on
prisoner and asylum cases, and we conclude by considering what we call
“divisive” religious liberty decisions—i.e., those that prompted dissent.
D. RFRA
1. Contraception Mandate (“Sex”)
As noted above, there were 10 successful RFRA decisions, all
involving the contraception mandate. This seems like a very large number,
given that there were only 10 other victories overall (5 partial victories in
Title VII cases, and 5 total victories in other cases).

86

Compare id. (reversing dismissal of a compelled speech claim) with Cressman v.
Thompson, 798 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2015) (ultimately rejecting the same claim).
87
We do not consider the lone partial victory under the Free Speech Clause because the
claim ultimately failed on the merits. Id.
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But a few considerations put this number in perspective. First, the 10
successful decisions came in only 6 separate cases. That is because several
cases generated multiple decisions. For example, in Newland v. Sebelius,
there was a district court decision granting a preliminary injunction,88 a
Tenth Circuit decision affirming the preliminary injunction in light of Hobby
Lobby,89 and then another district court decision entering a permanent
injunction.90 Although some non-contraception mandate cases also
generated multiple decisions, this happened significantly more often in
contraception mandate cases.
Second, 4 of the 10 favorable decisions were simply “clean up”
decisions following Hobby Lobby—that is, once the Tenth Circuit (or
Supreme Court) resolved Hobby Lobby, the pending cases presenting the
same issue were resolved the same way.91
Finally, the 10 favorable decisions in 6 separate contraception mandate
cases were also balanced by 7 losses in 5 separate contraception mandate
cases.92 Although these losses were eventually turned into wins (or
ultimately will be) by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hobby Lobby and
Little Sisters of the Poor, they show that contraception mandate cases were
far from a uniform success before the Supreme Court weighed in.
Perhaps even more interesting than the successful contraception
mandate cases are the contraception mandate cases (and other RFRA cases)
that were never filed. When the Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby, the
government and the dissent predicted “a flood of religious objections
regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and drugs,”93 such as “blood
transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists);
medications derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and
pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and
vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others).”94 They also predicted
that corporations would bring a rash of RFRA challenges outside the
88

881 F. Supp. 2d 1287.
542 F. App’x 706.
90
Newland v. Burwell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (D. Colo. 2015).
91
Armstrong v. Burwell, No. 13-cv-00563, 2014 WL 5317354 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2014);
Newland, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122; Newland, 542 F. App’x 706; Armstrong v. Sebelius, 531 F.
App’x 938 (10th Cir. 2013).
92
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151
(10th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-6294, 2012 WL
6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012); Ass’n of Christian Schs. Int’l v. Burwell, 75 F. Supp. 3d
1284 (D. Colo. 2014); Diocese of Cheyenne v. Sebelius, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (D. Wyo. 2014);
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Colo. 2013);
Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
93
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
94
Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89
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healthcare context.95 Several commentators made similar predictions.96
But these challenges have not materialized. Our data set extends
through February 24, 2017—thirty-two months after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hobby Lobby.97 During that time, there have been no RFRA
challenges in the Tenth Circuit to any other medical procedures or drugs.
Nor have there been any new RFRA challenges by for-profit corporations—
or any organization for that matter. In fact, there have been only two new
RFRA decisions at all—one involving a pro se individual’s attempt to
legalize marijuana,98 and one involving a Native American request to wear
an eagle feather at a high school graduation.99 Both were unsuccessful. By
contrast, in the thirty-two months after HHS promulgated the contraception
mandate, the courts in the Tenth Circuit had already decided 12 of the 18
contraception mandate decisions in our data set. So there has already been
ample time for the “flood” of new religious objections; it simply has not
materialized.100
2. Drugs
Examining unsuccessful RFRA claims also shows that courts can draw
sensible lines when applying RFRA. Two of those cases involved
possession of drugs. First, in United States v. Quaintance,101 drug smugglers
pled guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute marijuana,
but raised a RFRA defense, alleging that they were the founding members of
the “Church of Cognizance,” which taught that marijuana is a deity and
sacrament. Then-Judge Gorsuch, writing for the Tenth Circuit, rejected the

95

Id. at 2804–05.
See, e.g., Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of
Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J. F. 416, 419 (2016) (“[T]here is widespread
fear in some quarters—and presumably hope in others—that such claims might become a
template for similar claims, pursuant to federal or state RFRAs or analogous state
constitutional provisions, for religious exemptions from laws that prohibit discrimination in
employment, or in the provision of public accommodations, on the basis of sexual
orientation.”); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 98 (2015) (“Might [RFRAs] now be construed to
protect religiously motivated employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, or
discrimination by wedding vendors, merchants in other contexts, or government officials
against same-sex couples?”).
97
The Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby on June 30, 2014. 134 S. Ct. 2751.
98
Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014).
99
Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016)
(Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act).
100
Cf. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 4, at 54 (finding that a comparison of federal cases
involving a RFRA claim pre- and post-Hobby Lobby showed no significant drop in
government win rates).
101
608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch, J.).
96
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claim, finding that the purported religious beliefs were not sincere.102
Similarly, in Krumm v. Holder,103 the plaintiff brought a RFRA claim
challenging the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled
substance, alleging that the classification violated his religious freedom to
use cannabis as a holy anointing oil. The court held that the plaintiff had
failed to state a valid facial challenge under RFRA, because he failed to
allege that the restriction on marijuana was impermissible in all of its
applications.104
These cases demonstrate that RFRA is not a blank check. Courts do
not automatically accept all allegations of religious belief as “sincere,” and
they can easily weed out frivolous claims.105
3. Eagle Feathers
If anything, courts may be underenforcing RFRA for religious
minorities.106 An example from our data set involves Native American use
of eagle feathers. Aside from the contraception mandate cases, these are the
most common RFRA cases, with 3 decisions in the last 5 years (and 7 in the
last 10).107 In the last five years, every challenge was rejected. In the
previous five years, only two challenges were successful, and one of those
two was reversed on appeal.108
Eagle feathers play an important role in Native American religious
practices. But under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act,109 it is illegal
to kill eagles or possess eagle feathers or parts without a permit. Permits are
available for museums, scientists, zoos, farmers, and a wide variety of other
interests—such as power companies and airports, which kill hundreds of
eagles every year.110 Permits are also available for Native American
102

See id. at 719.
594 F. App’x 497.
104
Id. at 501.
105
Cf. Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoë Robinson
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842680 (“There are still few
examples of RFRA and state RFRAs giving controversial exemptions. Of course, religious
people sometimes make tendentious claims, particularly prisoners. But those claims do not
win. At every turn, the tendency has been toward underenforcement not overenforcement”).
106
Id.
107
See Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016);
United States v. Aguilar. 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925
F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012); United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah
2009), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d
1129 (D. Utah 2009); United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
108
Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308, rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274; Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129.
109
16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2016).
110
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
16 U.S.C. § 668(a)); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Preliminary Injunction, at 17–22,
103
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religious use—but only to members of “federally recognized” tribes.111
Because gaining federal recognition is very difficult,112 and many tribes
never gain it, there are currently thousands of Native Americans who are
forever prohibited from possessing even a single eagle feather.
The federal government’s restrictions on eagle feathers have led to
many conflicts. In the leading Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Wilgus,113
a non-Native American who had practiced a Native American religion for
many years was pulled over for speeding, and the officer searched his car for
drugs.114 Although no drugs were found, the officer did find eagle feathers—
resulting in criminal charges and a conviction.115 On appeal, the government
conceded that the criminal ban on possession of eagle feathers imposed a
“substantial burden” on the defendant’s religious exercise.116 This meant
that the government was required to satisfy strict scrutiny. But the Tenth
Circuit held that the government satisfied strict scrutiny, because the supply
of eagle feathers is limited and the government has a compelling interest in
“providing for the religious needs of members of federally-recognized
tribes.”117 Since the decision in Wilgus, there have been three more RFRA
cases involving the use of eagle feathers—all unsuccessful.118
But the result in Wilgus is questionable. Perhaps due to inadequate
briefing, the decision rests on the faulty premise that there is only one
legitimate source of eagle feathers—the National Eagle Feather
Repository—and that the repository has an extremely limited supply of eagle
feathers.119 On this view, eagle feathers are a “zero-sum game”: every
feather obtained by someone who is not a member of a federally recognized
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7:07-cv-060 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/McAllen-PI-Motion-file-stamped.pdf (describing the
eagle permits issued for non-religious uses).
111
50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (2017) (citing Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994,
25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 (1994)).
112
See id. Part 22; 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (establishing seven “mandatory criteria” with 34 subfactors or categories of evidence to gain federal recognition status).
113
638 F.3d 1274.
114
Id. at 1280.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1290.
118
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (upholding restriction
on permit); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016)
(rejecting free speech and free exercise claims); United States v. Aguilar, 527 Fed. App’x 808
(10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting RFRA defense to prosecution).
119
Compare Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291 (concluding “that there is no significant untapped
source of birds not already being sent to the [National Eagle Feather] Repository”), with
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 479 (5th Cir. 2014) (detailing
alternative sources to the National Eagle Feather Repository for obtaining eagle feathers,
including zoos and tribal-maintained eagle aviaries).
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tribe is taken away from a member of a federally recognized tribe.120 But in
fact, there are many ways to obtain eagle feathers beyond the repository.
There are federal permits to take live eagles;121 there are permits for
operating eagle aviaries, which supply a steady stream of molted feathers;122
and there are millions of feathers naturally molted every year in zoos and in
the wild, which could be picked up and used for religious ceremonies if not
for the federal prohibition.123 Beyond that, the court erred by focusing only
on permits for Native American religious use. There are also permits for
museums, scientists, zoos, airports, falconers, farmers, power companies,
and many others.124 So the regulation of eagle feathers is not a zero-sum
game between two different groups of Native Americans; it is a multi-faceted
game that often prefers commercial killing of eagles to the peaceful Native
American religious use of feathers. And it is hard to see how the government
has a compelling interest in prohibiting a Native American from possessing
even a single feather—without ever killing an eagle—when it
simultaneously allows power companies to kill hundreds of eagles for
nonreligious reasons every year.125
Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar126 parts ways with Wilgus. In McAllen, an
undercover federal agent raided a Native American powwow and confiscated
feathers from a nationally renowned feather dancer who had used the
feathers for many decades.127 Because the dancer was not a member of a
federally recognized tribe, he was in violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act. But the Fifth Circuit, citing Hobby Lobby, held that the
government failed to satisfy strict scrutiny under RFRA. The court reasoned
that the limited supply of feathers at the repository was a problem “of the
government’s own making,” because the government ran an “inefficient”
120

638 F.3d at 1293.
16 U.S.C. § 668a; 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2016).
122
See generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL FISH AND WILDLIFE PERMIT
APPLICATION FORM FOR A NATIVE AMERICAN EAGLE AVIARY PERMIT (FORM 3–200-78)
(2013), http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-78.pdf.
123
Mem. from the U.S. Attorney General to the Assistant Attorney General, Environment
and National Resources Division, All U.S. Attorneys, and Director, Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys (Oct. 12 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2012/10/22/efpolicy.pdf (discussing the possession or use of eagle feathers or other parts for tribal, cultural,
and religious purposes).
124
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at 17–22, McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7-60 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) http://s3.amazonaws.com/
becketpdf/McAllen-PI-Motion-file-stamped.pdf (describing the eagle permits issued for nonreligious uses).
125
Id. at 20–22.
126
764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
127
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, BECKET (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.becket
law.org/case/mcallen-grace-brethren-church-v-jewell/#caseDetail.
121
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system.128 And the court held that the government had failed to show that
“other avenues” of obtaining feathers were infeasible.129 In the wake of
McAllen, the federal government entered a historic settlement agreement
with the plaintiff and over 400 other Native Americans who are not members
of federally recognized tribes, guaranteeing their right to possess feathers
and access the repository.130 This settlement makes the result in Wilgus even
harder to defend and may prompt additional litigation in the Tenth Circuit.
E. Free Exercise
When a RFRA claim is unavailable, litigants must often rely on the Free
Exercise Clause. There were two successful free exercise decisions. One
involved a challenge to Utah’s bigamy statute by a polygamist family
featured on the reality show “Sister Wives.”131 The district court held that
the statute, as applied to religious cohabitation, was not neutral toward
religion and was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.132 But the Tenth Circuit vacated that decision and ordered the case
to be dismissed as moot, because the government adopted a new enforcement
policy eliminating any credible threat of prosecution.133
The other successful free exercise decision involved a novel dispute
between two Native American tribes over a request to kill bald eagles.134 The
Northern Arapaho Tribe applied to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to take
two bald eagles for religious purposes from the Wind River Reservation,
where the tribe has lived for many years.135 But the Eastern Shoshone Tribe
also lives on the Wind River Reservation, and they claimed that “[a]llowing
an enemy tribe the right to kill [their] sacred eagles” would violate their
religious beliefs.136 The federal government tried to reach a compromise that
would satisfy the religious beliefs of both tribes: it granted a permit allowing
the Northern Arapaho Tribe to take two bald eagles outside the
128

764 F.3d at 479.
Id.
130
Press Release, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Native Americans Win, Feds
Flee Feather Fight: Government Surrenders Sacred Feathers; Admits Undercover Powwow
Raid Was Illegal (June 14, 2016), http://www.becketlaw.org/media/native-americans-winfeds-flee-feather-fight/; Settlement Agreement, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell,
No. 7:07-cv-060 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2016), http://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Exhibit-1Settlement-Agreement-file-stamped.pdf. Co-author Goodrich was counsel for the plaintiffs in
McAllen.
131
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013), vacated as moot, 822 F.3d
1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
132
947 F. Supp. 2d. at 1209–22.
133
822 F.3d 1151.
134
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015).
135
Id. at 1164.
136
Id. at 1166.
129
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reservation.137 But the Northern Arapaho Tribe sued under RFRA and the
Free Exercise Clause, claiming that their religious beliefs required them to
take the eagles from within the reservation.138
The district court rejected the RFRA claim at an early stage of the case,
relying on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wilgus.139 But then, in a highly
unusual twist, it ruled in the tribe’s favor under the Free Exercise Clause,
citing the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Hobby Lobby and Holt,
and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McAllen.140 The court held that the
government’s action was “facially discriminatory because [it] burdened the
Northern Arapaho Tribe’s culture and religion based on the cultural or
religious objection of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe.”141 And it held that the
action failed strict scrutiny, because “[t]he asserted harm to the culture and
religion of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe . . . is miniscule.”142 The court did
not explain why it chose to resolve the case on free exercise grounds, rather
than revisiting its RFRA decision in light of intervening precedent. That
makes this one of the very rare cases to rule against a RFRA claim on the
merits but in favor of a free exercise claim based on the same facts.143
This decision is likely best understood as a RFRA decision in free
exercise clothing. Although the court said it was avoiding RFRA’s
“substantial burden” inquiry,144 it based its decision primarily on Hobby
Lobby and Holt, which are RFRA and RLUIPA cases, respectively—not free
exercise cases. And the court’s free exercise analysis focused on the fact
that the government had “burdened the Northern Arapaho Tribe’s culture
and religion”145—which sounds more like an analysis of a RFRA claim than
a free exercise claim.
A final takeaway on free exercise claims is that they are rare and hard
to win. Of the 23 Free Exercise claims raised, the courts reached the merits
in only 10.146 Of the 10 decisions where the court addressed the merits,
137

Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1167.
139
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–18 (D. Wyo. 2012) (discussing
Wilgus).
140
92 F. Supp. 3d at 1180–90.
141
Id. at 1179.
142
Id. at 1187.
143
The only similar cases we are aware of are Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1543
n.2 (D. Neb. 1996) and Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, Pa., 35 F.3d 846, 849–50 (3d Cir.
1994).
144
92 F. Supp. 3d at 1182 (“[The Court] need not consider whether Defendants’ final
agency action placed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion.”)
145
Id. at 1179 (emphasis added).
146
This is in part because free exercise claims are often brought in conjunction with
RFRA claims (10 times in our data set), and if a RFRA claim is successful, the court typically
does not reach the free exercise claim. Free exercise claims were also brought in conjunction
138
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plaintiffs were successful only twice. Even then, one of the two was vacated
as moot, and the other is better viewed as a RFRA claim. The paucity of
successful free exercise claims is probably explained in part by the fact that
RFRA provides a broad statutory remedy that must be decided before any
free exercise claim when the federal government is the defendant, in part by
the fact that free exercise claims involve difficult threshold questions about
when a law is “neutral” or “generally applicable,” and in part by the fact that
courts remain hesitant to apply the Free Exercise Clause vigorously in the
wake of Employment Division v. Smith.147
F. Establishment Clause
There were three successful Establishment Clause decisions in two
different cases—one involving an unusual challenge to a sharia ban,148 and
the other involving a run-of-the-mill challenge to a Ten Commandments
display.149
The sharia ban was a proposed constitutional amendment in Oklahoma.
The amendment would have prohibited Oklahoma courts from relying on
“the legal precepts of other nations or cultures,” “[s]pecifically, . . .
international law or Sharia Law.”150 So, for example, if a private arbitration
agreement between Muslims incorporated elements of Islamic law, it could
not be enforced in court; but if a private arbitration agreement between
Christians or Jews incorporated elements of biblical or Jewish law, it
could.151
The amendment was challenged by several Muslims under both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Following the Tenth Circuit’s
reasoning from an earlier decision in the case,152 the district court resolved
the case by applying what it called the “Larson test” under the Establishment

with claims under the Establishment Clause (11 times), Free Speech Clause (11 times), Equal
Protection Clause (6 times), and freedom of association (4 times).
147
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See, e.g., Amy Adamczyk, John Wibraniec
& Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and
RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 250 Table 1 (2004) (finding that the success rate of free
exercise claims dropped from 39.5% to 28.4% after Smith, and that the number of claims
dropped from 310 decided in the nine-and-a-quarter years before the decision to 38 in the
three-and-a-half years after); but see Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally
Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2016).
148
Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
149
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D.N.M. 2014), aff’d, 841 F.3d 848
(10th Cir. 2016).
150
966 F. Supp. 2d at 1200–01.
151
See Luke W. Goodrich, Sharia Across the Pond, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2009, 5:30 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/06/sharia-courts-us-islam.
152
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).

GOODRICH BUSICK (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

SEX, DRUGS, AND EAGLE FEATHERS

2/18/2018 5:13 PM

391

Clause.153 Under this test, the amendment was subject to strict scrutiny
because it made “‘explicit and deliberate distinctions’ among religions.”154
And the court held that the amendment failed strict scrutiny because the state
failed to identify “any actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to
solve.”155 Having decided that the amendment violated the Establishment
Clause, the court declined to address the merits of the claim under the Free
Exercise Clause.156
This decision is interesting not for the result—which is likely correct—
but for its reliance on the Establishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise
Clause. By singling out “Sharia Law,” the text of the amendment singled
out one religion, Islam, for unfavorable treatment. Such singling out is
ordinarily treated as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.157 Yet the court
relied on the Establishment Clause. Why?
There are several possible reasons. First, it is currently easier to
establish standing to sue under the Establishment Clause than under other
provisions of the Constitution.158 Courts often allow plaintiffs to bring
Establishment Clause claims based on nothing more than “offensive contact”
with a government policy or symbol with which they disagree.159 Thus, if
there were any doubts about the plaintiffs’ standing in Awad, that would push
the court toward relying on the Establishment Clause.
Second, because the Establishment Clause is a structural restraint on
government power, remedies for a violation of the Establishment Clause tend
to be broader than for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.160 If a
153

966 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
Id.
155
Id. at 1203–04.
156
Id. at 1202 n.1.
157
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019,
2024 (2017) (“[T]arget[ing] the religious for special disabilities based on their religious
status” is a violation of “the Free Exercise Clause.” (citation omitted)); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 541–42 (1993) (stating that an
“attempt to disfavor [a] religion” violates the Free Exercise Clause, while “governmental
efforts to benefit religion or particular religions” typically violate the Establishment Clause);
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (Souter, J.,
plurality opinion) (applying Establishment Clause where religious group was vested with
civic power but noting that if the group had instead been “denied” “the rights of citizens
simply because of [its] religious affiliations,” that would be a “free exercise” case); see also
Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1800 (2006)
(When “restrictions on minority faiths are [not] part of any effort to establish some other
religion, . . . such restrictions are . . . treated as a free exercise issue.”).
158
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
Petitioners, Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (No. 08-472) (arguing that the standing in
Establishment Clause cases should be similar to standing in Equal Protection Clause cases).
159
See id. (collecting examples).
160
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
154
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government action violates the Establishment Clause, it will often be struck
down in its entirety. But if an action violates the Free Exercise Clause, the
remedy may be merely an injunction protecting the specific religious
claimant.161
Third, since the Supreme Court narrowed the application of the Free
Exercise Clause in Smith,162 lower courts have been hesitant to invalidate
government actions under the Free Exercise Clause.163 By contrast, the legal
standards under the Establishment Clause are notoriously malleable,164
making the Establishment Clause a more flexible vehicle for resolving
contested claims.
Interestingly, this dynamic in Awad arose again in litigation over
Executive Order No. 13780—commonly known as President Trump’s
“travel ban”—which suspended entry to the United States by certain foreign
nationals from six Muslim-majority countries.165 In Trump v. International
Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”), the plaintiffs argued that the Executive
Order was in fact a “Muslim ban” that singled out Muslims for disfavored
treatment.166 But the plaintiffs did not bring a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause; instead, they relied on the Establishment Clause.167 This is likely for
the same reasons described above: the Establishment Clause may have
helped them skirt difficult questions of standing; the Establishment Clause
may have allowed them to strike down the Executive Order in its entirety,
rather than obtain an injunction limited to the plaintiffs; and some courts may
have been more receptive to a claim under the Establishment Clause than
under the Free Exercise Clause.

Neither Party, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S. Aug.
17, 2017) [hereinafter Becket IRAP Amicus Brief].
161
See id.
162
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
163
See supra note 147.
164
See, e.g., Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. 687 F.3d 840, 869–77 (Easterbook, J. & Posner,
C.J., dissenting from en banc decision) (calling Lemon and “no endorsement” tests
“hopelessly open-ended”); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools—An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 5 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation
of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1986).
165
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017). The travel ban has since
been modified by a Presidential Proclamation, which includes new restrictions on Venezuela,
North Korea, and Chad, and eliminates restriction on Sudan. See Presidential Proclamation
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sep. 24, 2017).
166
See Brief in Opposition, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16-1436 (U.S.
June 12, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/16-1436-Trump-v.Int27l-Refugee-Assistance-BIO.pdf.
167
See id.
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But the plaintiffs in IRAP also attempted to go one significant step
beyond Awad. In Awad, the court applied the “Larson test,” which requires
strict scrutiny whenever a law discriminates among religions.168 But in
IRAP, the plaintiffs invoked the “Lemon test,” which invalidates a law
automatically if it has a religious purpose.169 In other words, the government
gets no opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny. That was particularly important
in IRAP, because the government claimed that the Executive Order was
justified by weighty national security interests.170 But because the lower
courts applied the Lemon test, they enjoined the Executive Order without
ever weighing the government’s alleged interest.171
Both Awad and IRAP were wrong to view the challenged laws
exclusively through the lens of the Establishment Clause. That does not
mean that they reached the wrong result. But a claim that the government is
targeting one religious group for disfavor—rather than giving other religious
groups preferential treatment—is most naturally viewed through the lens of
the Free Exercise Clause.172 The Free Exercise Clause allows the courts to
consider the concrete harms to the specific plaintiffs.173 It gives the courts
well-established tools to ferret out hostility toward religion, rather than
relying on the subjective Lemon test.174 It allows the courts to craft a remedy
that addresses specific harms. And it allows the courts to balance competing
governmental interests.175
168

Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
See id. (despite invoking the Lemon test, plaintiffs never mention or cite Lemon).
170
See Brief for the Petitioners, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project at 9–10, 45,
Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S. Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content
/uploads/2017/08/16-1436-ts.pdf.
171
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), as amended (May
31, 2017), as amended (June 15, 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
172
See Becket IRAP Amicus Brief, supra note 160.
173
See id. at 28–31.
174
See id. at 21–25 (Lukumi offers seven ways that a plaintiff can prove that a law is not
neutral or generally applicable with respect to religion: (1) facially targeting religion; (2)
resulting in a religious gerrymander in its real operation; (3) failing to apply to analogous
secular conduct; (4) giving the government open-ended discretion to make individualized
exemptions; (5) being selectively enforced; (6) having its historical background show that the
lawmaker’s purpose was to discriminate based on religion; and (7) discriminating between
religions).
175
See id. at 25–28. It is also better to understand Larson as a case arising under both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The plaintiffs in Larson invoked both clauses.
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 233 (1982). So did the Supreme Court, stating that “[t]h[e]
constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the
continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.” Id. at 245. And the Court applied strict
scrutiny. Id. at 246. Thus, at least one decision in the Tenth Circuit has noted that Larson is
supported by both clauses. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257–58 (10th
Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.) (“[D]iscrimination [among religions] is forbidden by the Free
Exercise Clause as well. [citing Larson] . . . So while the Establishment Clause frames much
of our inquiry, the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause
169
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The other successful Establishment Clause decision in our data set
involved a challenge to a Ten Commandments display. In Felix, a city in
New Mexico installed a Ten Commandments monument—along with
monuments to the Gettysburg Address, Declaration of Independence, and
Bill of Rights—on the City Hall Lawn.176 City residents challenged the Ten
Commandments monument as a violation of the Establishment Clause, and
the Tenth Circuit agreed.177 Applying the Lemon test, the Tenth Circuit held
that the text of the monument (taken from the King James Bible), the location
of the monument in front of city hall, the installation of the monument at a
religious ceremony, and the fact that the monument immediately prompted
litigation all contributed to a finding that the government had “endorsed”
religion.178 This “taint of [government] endorsement” was not cured by the
fact that the monument was created and donated by a private party, was
accompanied by several secular monuments, and was accompanied by a sign
disclaiming any government endorsement of religion.179
The result in Felix is not uncommon. Lower courts have struggled for
years to apply the Lemon test in any consistent and objective fashion. That
test has been widely criticized by the lower courts,180 commentators,181 and
Supreme Court Justices alike182 as largely subjective, allowing courts to
proceed along similar lines.”).
176
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016).
177
Id. at 851.
178
Id. at 857–59.
179
Id. at 860–64.
180
See, e.g., Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869–78 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Easterbook, J. & Posner, J., dissenting from en banc decision) (calling Lemon and “no
endorsement” test “hopelessly open-ended”); Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 574
F.3d 1235, 1235 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kelly, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(noting that “[w]hether Lemon . . . and its progeny actually create discernable ‘tests,’ rather
than a mere ad hoc patchwork, is debatable” and describing the “judicial morass resulting
from the Supreme Court’s opinions”); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir.
2008) (“Confounded by the ten individual opinions in [McCreary and Van Orden] . . . courts
have described the current state of the law as both ‘Establishment Clause purgatory’ and
‘Limbo’” (citations omitted)); id. at 1023–24 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)
(applauding the majority’s “heroic attempt to create a new world of useful principle out of the
Supreme Court’s dark materials” and lamenting “[t]he still stalking Lemon test and the other
tests and factors, which have floated to the top of this chaotic ocean from time to time,” as
“so indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not become more
fathomable”).
181
See, e.g., Choper, supra note 164; McConnell, supra note 164.
182
See, e.g., Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S. Ct. 2283, 2284 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (calling the endorsement test “antiquated”); Mount
Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 567 U.S. 944, 944 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“Establishment Clause jurisprudence is undoubtedly in need of clarity”); Utah
Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13-21 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Establishment Clause jurisprudence [is] in shambles,”
“nebulous,” “erratic,” “no principled basis,” “Establishment Clause purgatory,”
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reach virtually any result. Thus, it would have been just as easy to write an
opinion saying that the Ten Commandments monument did not endorse
religion because it was donated by a private party, accompanied by secular
monuments, and attended by a disclaimer.183
The more interesting aspect of Felix is the dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc by Judges Kelly and Tymkovich, who proposed an
alternative method of resolving Establishment Clause cases.184 They noted
that the Supreme Court’s two most recent Establishment Clause decisions
have moved away from the subjective Lemon test and have instead embraced
a historical approach.185 Specifically, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, which
involved a challenge to legislative prayer, the Court held that “the
Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical
practices and understandings.’”186 And in Van Orden v. Perry, which
involved a Ten Commandments monument, the Supreme Court specifically
avoided relying on Lemon and instead said that its analysis was “driven both
by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history.”187
To flesh out this historical approach, Judges Kelly and Tymkovich
drew on the scholarship of former Tenth Circuit judge Michael McConnell,
who has written that an “establishment” at the time of the founding consisted
of several recognized features: “(1) [state] control over doctrine, governance,
and personnel of the church; (2) compulsory church attendance; (3) financial
“impenetrable,” “ad hoc patchwork,” “limbo,” “incapable of consistent application,” “our
mess,” “little more than intuition and a tape measure,”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing the
Lemon test to a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
644 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by White, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting); Allegheny Cty. v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–57 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346–49 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107–13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 90–91
(White, J., dissenting).
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has treated the Lemon factors as “no more than
helpful signposts,” if it has applied them at all. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005)
(plurality opinion); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (not
applying Lemon); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (same); Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (same).
183
See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“When everything matters, when nothing is dispositive, when
we must juggle incommensurable factors, a judge can do little but announce his gestalt.”).
184
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc).
185
Id. at 1219.
186
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
187
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 686; see also id. at 699–700 (Breyer, J., concurring);
Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery
of History, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71 (2014).

GOODRICH BUSICK (DO NOT DELETE)

396

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/18/2018 5:13 PM

[Vol. 48:353

support; (4) prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches; (5) use of church
institutions for public functions; and (6) restriction of political participation
to members of the established church.”188 Because the City’s actions in Felix
“met none of the traditional elements of . . . the original public meaning of
‘establishment,’” Judges Kelly and Tymkovich concluded that the City’s
actions should not be construed as an establishment of religion.189
This type of historical analysis seems likely to become the prevailing
method of resolving Establishment Clause claims. The Lemon test is now
on its last legs;190 it has been criticized by a majority of recent Justices, and
the Court has studiously avoided applying it in recent cases.191 The Court
has increasingly relied on a historical approach to interpret the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the Second,192 Fourth,193 and
Sixth194 Amendments, as well as the First Amendment itself.195 Its most
recent Establishment Clause case held that “the Establishment Clause must
be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings.’”196
Thus, it seems like only a matter of time before the Court makes clear that
this sort of historical approach should guide interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.
This will be a welcome development. A historical approach will place
the interpretation of the Establishment Clause on a far more objective basis
than under the Lemon test. It will connect the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause to the motivating concerns of the founders—namely,
coercion and control of religion.197 And it will reduce unnecessary division

188
847 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and
Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2105, 2131 (2003)).
189
Id. at 1221; see also Rassbach, supra note 187, at 92 (proposing a similar approach).
190
Rassbach, supra note 187, at 90.
191
See supra note 182.
192
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–97 (2008) (examining the meaning
of the Second Amendment “at the time of the founding”).
193
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 & n.3 (2012) (examining the “original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment” because “we must assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”).
194
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (examining “the practice of
criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years
surrounding our Nation’s founding”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)
(examining “the historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause to understand its
meaning”).
195
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702
(2012) (applying historical analysis to determine the existence and scope of the First
Amendment ministerial exception).
196
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
197
See McConnell, supra note 188, at 2131; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost
Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
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over many of the less significant matters of religious expression that have
come to fill the courts’ Establishment Clause docket.198
G. Title VII
In Title VII cases, there were five favorable decisions. All five were
“partial” victories—where the plaintiff merely survived a motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment. Three of the five involved EEOC
enforcement actions to protect Muslims.199 One involved a religious
discrimination claim by Mormons—the only case in our data set that was
brought by Mormon plaintiffs.200 The last case involved an employee
allegedly fired by the Kansas government for not attending church.201
It seems noteworthy that three of the five successful Title VII decisions
involved Muslims, given that Muslims constitute less than 1% of the Tenth
Circuit population. Surveying lower federal courts between 1996–2005,
Sisk and Heise found that the most common religious liberty claims brought
by Muslims, aside from prisoner claims, were employment discrimination
cases against the federal government.202 However, they also found that
Muslim claimants were nearly twice as likely to lose than non-Muslim
claimants.203 But unlike Sisk and Heise, our data set includes cases brought
against private employers. And all three successful Muslim claims involved
EEOC enforcement actions. Thus, our findings may speak less to the overall
success rates of Muslim claimants and more to the possibility of increased
enforcement of Title VII by EEOC on behalf of Muslims.204
198

Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (noting that Establishment Clause cases often “require[e] scrutiny more
commonly associated with interior decorators than with the judiciary”).
199
EEOC v. 704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D.N.M. 2013); EEOC v.
JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2015); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs.,
Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015).
200
Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013).
201
Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y of State for Kan., 209 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (D. Kan. 2016).
In a later decision in that case, the jury rejected the employee’s religious discrimination claim,
resulting in a loss for the religious claimant. See Fired Employee Loses Religious
Discrimination Suit Against Kansas Secretary of State, RELIGION CLAUSE (Aug. 25, 2017),
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2017/08/fired-employee-loses-religious.html.
202
Heise & Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 249.
203
Id.
204
In the wake of 9/11, “the EEOC saw a 250% increase in the number of religion-based
discrimination charges involving Muslims,” and although the uptick related to 9/11 decreased,
the EEOC continues to see an increase in charges involving religious discrimination against
Muslims. U.S. EEOC, What You Should Know About the EEOC and Religious and National
Origin Discrimination Involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian
Communities, https://www.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/wysk/religion_national_origin_9-11.cf
m (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). The EEOC reports that it has filed “nearly 90 lawsuits alleging
religious and national origin discrimination involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern
and South Asian communities.” Id. Specifically, from 2009 until late October 2015, there
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H. Prisoner and Asylum Cases
For most of our analysis, we have excluded claims brought by prisoners
and asylum seekers. But a few more observations on those claims are in
order.
Of the 39 prisoner decisions in our data set, 15 (38%) were decided on
purely procedural grounds. This is double the rate of purely procedural
decisions in non-prisoner and non-asylum cases (19%). But that is not
surprising, given that 87% of prisoner cases were pro se.
Of the 24 decisions that addressed the merits, 6 were successful205—
producing a success rate of 25%. Like the Title VII cases, all of the
successful decisions involved “partial” success—i.e., rulings that the
plaintiff survived summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. The 6
successful decisions involved 5 RLUIPA claims, 3 free exercise claims, and
1 equal protection claim. (There are more successful claims than decisions,
because some successful decisions involved multiple successful claims.)
The 25% success rate for prisoner decisions is surprisingly high. It is
more than half the success rate of non-prisoner and non-asylum decisions
(44%), and it approaches the success rate in those cases when the
contraception mandate decisions are excluded (35%). This is especially
surprising given that 87% of prisoner decisions involved pro se plaintiffs
(including 5 of 6 successful decisions), compared with only 10% of nonprisoner and non-asylum decisions.
But two factors should temper this surprise. First, none of the 6
successful decisions involved complete success; they were merely rulings
that the plaintiff survived summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.
Second, 37 of the 39 prisoner decisions came from the Tenth Circuit, while
only 2 came from district courts.206 That is because our data set excludes
unreported district court decisions, and district courts resolve most pro se
were 54 cases in which the EEOC brought religious accommodation lawsuits on behalf of
employees. Eugene Volokh, The EEOC, Religious Accommodation Claims, and Muslims,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2016). Of those, 14 (26%) were brought on
behalf of Muslim employees, 6 (11%) on behalf of Seventh-day Adventists, 6 (11%) on behalf
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and 1 (2%) on behalf of a class including both Muslims and nonMuslims. Id. The rest were brought on behalf of members of various other religious groups.
Id.
205
See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); Robertson v.
Biby, 647 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App’x
692 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA and free exercise); Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813
(10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA, free exercise, and equal protection); Marshall v. Wyo. Dep’t of
Corr., 592 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2014) (free exercise); McKinley v. Maddox, 493 F. App’x
928 (10th Cir. 2012) (free exercise).
206
See Woodstock v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016) (claim survived
defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (D. Wyo.
2014) (plaintiff’s preliminary injunction denied on RLUIPA and free exercise claims).
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prisoner cases via unreported decisions. Thus, our data set excludes a
substantial number of unsuccessful prisoner decisions, which would
significantly reduce the success rate. That said, an interesting line of future
research would be to develop a data set that enables comparison of the
success rates of prisoner claims compared with other types of religious
freedom claims. Particularly since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Holt207—ruling unanimously in favor of a Muslim prisoner’s RLUIPA
claim—the success rates in prisoner cases may rise.
Of the 20 asylum decisions, only 1 resulted in even partial success—a
remand to the BIA to consider a claim it had failed to address.208 This is
likely due to the high level of deference given to the BIA.209
I.

Cases Involving a Dissent

Lastly, in addition to considering successful religious liberty claims, we
wanted to explore the decisions that were most divisive—namely, those that
generated dissent.
Of the 23 Tenth Circuit decisions in non-prisoner, non-asylum cases, 6
(26%) involved at least one dissent.210 This rate of dissent is more than ten
times higher than the rate of dissent in Tenth Circuit cases generally
(2.4%)211—suggesting that religious liberty claims proved to be difficult.
However, this number is also affected by the spate of contraception mandate
cases, which generated 3 of the 6 dissents.212 Absent the contraception
mandate cases, the rate of dissent was more modest but still over six times
the average—at 15%.

207

Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015).
Li v. Holder, 607 F. App’x 818, 825 (10th Cir. 2015) (remanding to the BIA to
consider claim based on fear of future religious persecution).
209
See Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (detailing deferential standard
of review).
210
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir.
2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015) (panel
decision); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.
2015) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc); Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139
(10th Cir. 2013).
211
To calculate this rate, we first searched all Tenth Circuit decisions for adv: DA(aft 0224-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), yielding 6,131 cases. We then searched all Tenth Circuit
decisions for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017) & DIS(dissent!), yielding 148 cases.
148/6,131=0.024 or 2.4%.
212
See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (en banc); Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d 1151
(panel decision); Little Sisters of the Poor, 799 F.3d 1315 (dissent from denial of rehearing
en banc).
208
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The six decisions involving dissents came in five cases. Three of these
we have already discussed: Felix (Ten Commandments),213 Hobby Lobby
(contraception mandate),214 and Little Sisters of the Poor (contraception
mandate).215 The fourth was EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
which involved a Title VII employment discrimination claim brought by a
Muslim job applicant.216 And the fifth was Cressman v. Thompson, which
involved a claim of compelled speech.217
Notably, three of these five cases (Little Sisters of the Poor, Hobby
Lobby, and Abercrombie) were eventually heard on the merits by the
Supreme Court.218 All three were resolved in favor of the religious
claimant—with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Hobby Lobby affirmed, its
ruling in Abercrombie reversed, and its ruling in Little Sisters of the Poor
vacated.
Ultimately, despite the small sample size, these results suggest that
religious liberty cases tend to present some of the more difficult and divisive
issues confronting the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
It is no secret that religious liberty can be a divisive issue. Precisely
because of that, discussions about the issue should be informed by concrete
data. Although it can be tempting to build a narrative about religious liberty
based on a small number of high profile cases—such as Hobby Lobby and
Little Sisters of the Poor—those cases are not the whole story. The whole
story is more complex—and more interesting. It is a story of prisoners and
asylum seekers, employees and Ten Commandments monuments, Muslims
and nonbelievers. It is a story of a relatively small number of cases, brought
predominantly on behalf of non-Christian religious minorities, meeting
limited success.
Our empirical study raises a number of interesting questions. For
example, why are there so few cases? Is it because our society already does
a good job of protecting religious liberty? Or is it because certain types of
religious claims are so difficult to win? Similarly, why are non-Christian
religious minorities bringing a disproportionate share of cases? Are they

213

Felix, 847 F.3d 1214 (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (en banc).
215
Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d 1151 (panel decision); Little Sisters of the Poor,
799 F.3d 1315 (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
216
731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013).
217
Cressman, 719 F.3d 1139.
218
Zubik v. Burwell (Little Sisters of the Poor), 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028
(2015).
214

GOODRICH BUSICK (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

SEX, DRUGS, AND EAGLE FEATHERS

2/18/2018 5:13 PM

401

more likely to sue? Or are they more likely to suffer a violation of their
religious liberty? And finally, what caused the anomalous spate of cases
challenging the contraception mandate? Was it a new kind of litigiousness
by Christians? Or was it a new kind of overreach by the federal government?
Our study does not answer these questions. But it does place them in a
more informed context. It suggests that Hobby Lobby, while important, was
not a turning point in religious liberty litigation. It has not prompted a flood
of new litigation by Christians or for-profit corporations. If anything, its
main effect has been to provide more protection for religious minorities like
the Native Americans who won the right to use eagle feathers in McAllen, or
the Muslim prisoner who won the right to grow a beard in Holt. These
religious minorities were the main religious liberty claimants before Hobby
Lobby, and they remain the main religious liberty claimants afterwards.
Ironically, then, the main beneficiaries of the win for Christian claimants in
Hobby Lobby may be non-Christian religious minorities.

